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CONSPIRACY: THE CRIMINAL AGREEMENT
IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE*
PAUL MARCUS**
Professor Marcus combines empirical research and theoretical
analysis in this comprehensive study of the conspiracy doctrine. The
article shows that the theoretical reasons for the conspiracy doctrine
are inapplicable to most actual conspiracy prosecutions and that the
practical reasons for conspiracy charges are often unacceptable
prosecutorial shortcuts. Although ultimately concluding that the
conspiracy doctrine is needed in some limited instances, Professor
Marcus indicates that prosecutors should bring conspiracy charges
only when justified by proper reasons and that courts should
consider such charges more carefully.
[C]ollective criminal agreement-partnership in crime-presents
a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts.
Concerted action both increases the likelihood that the criminal
object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability
that the individuals involved will depart from their path of
criminality. Group association for criminal purposes often, if not
normally, makes possible the attainment of ends more complex
than those which one criminal could accomplish. Nor is the
danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the particular end
toward which it has embarked. Combination in crime makes
more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original
purpose for which the group was formed. In sum, the danger
which a conspiracy generates is not confined to the substantive
offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise.
Justice Felix Frankfurter'
* *The research for this study was conducted with funds provided by a grant from the National
Science Foundation and by a supplemental grant from the Program in Law and Society,
University of Illinois. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author.
Copyright 01976 by Paul Marcus.
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois; A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971, University of
California, Los Angeles. The author acknowledges the valuable research aid of Dan Hayes, a
member of the class of 1977, University of Illinois College of Law. In addition, special thanks are
due to Professor Norman Abrams and Becca Nimmer Marcus for their help in preparing the
questionnaire on criminal conspiracy, and Professors John Nowak and Melville Nimmer for their
careful review of an early draft of this article.
1. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.).
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If there are still any citizens interested in protecting human
liberty, let them study the conspiracy law of the United States.
Clarence Darrow2
INTRODUCTION
Throughout this century, judges, practicing attorneys, and scholars
have had a love-hate affair with the concept of a crime of conspiracy.
Few criminal law doctrines have generated as much analysis. One
need only look to the wealth of law review articles 3 and reported
cases4 discussing conspiracy doctrine to realize the impact of
conspiracy law on American jurisprudence. These discussions, along
with the widespread assumption that prosecutors utilize conspiracy
as an effective tool against serious crime, I make the law of conspiracy
most controversial. 6 This controversy has thrust the law of conspiracy
2. C. DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 64 (1932).
3. See, e.g., Arens, Conspiracy Revisited, 3 BUFFALO L. REV. 242 (1954); Filvaroff, Conspiracy
and the First Amendmen4 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189 (1972); Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the
United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959); Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV.
624 (1941); Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1973);
O'Dougherty, Prosecution and Defense Under Conspiracy Indictments, 9 BROOKLYN L. REV. 263
(1940); Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEo. L.J. 328 (1947); Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy,
35 HARv. L. REV. 393 (1922); Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REV.
920 (1959); Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime orProtection of Individual
Defendants, 62 HARv. L. REV. 276 (1948).
4. The important Supreme Court decisions alone are numerous. See, e.g., Iannelli v. United
States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975) (Wharton's rule); United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (intent
element); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961) (liability for conspiracy, substantive
offenses); Yates v. United States. 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (first amendment and conspiracy);
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (scope, duration of conspiracy); Lutwak v.
United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (elements, duration, evidence of conspiracy); Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949) (evidence of conspiracy); Blumenthal v. United States, 332
U.S. 539 (1947) (evidence, number of conspiracies); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750
(1946) (number of conspiracies); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (liability for
conspiracy, substantive acts).
5. See Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259,263 (2d Cir. 1925) (L. Hand, J.) (conspiracy is the
"darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery"); United States v. Kissel, 173 F. 823, 823-28
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) (increasing tendency to indict for conspiracies when crimes committed),
rev'd, 218 U.S. 601 (1910); Note, supra note 3, at 276.
6. A recent, dramatic use of criminal conspiracy charges was the Watergate trial. The three
primary defendants, John N. Mitchell, H.R. Haldeman, and John D. Ehrlichman, were convicted
of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury. See generally United States v. Haldeman, -
F.2d-, No. 75-1381 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 1976) (per curiam) (en banc),petition for cert. filed, 45
U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1976) (No. 76-793).
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into the debate on the role and purposes of our criminal justice
system. 7
A careful analysis of the conspiracy offense requires an orientation
in both theory and practice. Consequently, this article includes both a
traditional critique of criminal conspiracy and an analysis of the
questions and answers that prosecutors and defense counsel raise.8
The research for this article was conducted during 1975 and 1976. It
consisted, in part, of interviews with prosecutors and defense
attorneys from New York, Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Boston, New
Orleans, St. Louis, Indianapolis, Chicago, Houston, Albuquerque,
San Diego, Los Angeles, Oakland, and San Francisco. 9 In addition, a
questionnaire dealing with issues of criminal conspiracy was
distributed in the spring of 1976 to 1,620 persons: 0 federal district
and circuit court judges; supreme court justices from California,
Texas (Court of Criminal Appeals), Ohio, Illinois, and New York
(Court of Appeals); 150 criminal law professors; all 94 United States
attorneys; and a large sample of the membership of the National
District Attorneys Association and the National College of Criminal
Defense Lawyers and Public Defenders. 1 Eight hundred and twenty-
two persons, half of those surveyed, responded substantively to the
7. Perhaps the leading component sharpening the debate is the proposed recodification of the
federal criminal code. See Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
See generally Schwartz & Blakey, Introductory Memorandum and Excerpts From Consultant's
Report on Conspiracy and Organized Crime: Sections 1004 and 1005, in 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 381 (1970).
8. Professor Alschuler used a similar approach to analyze plea bargaining. See Alschuler, The
Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975).
9. The interviewing outline is reprinted in Appendix A.
10. The questionnaire is reprinted in Appendix B.
11. The geographic mix of the persons responding was quite good.
Percentage
Population of respondents
More than 500,000 33.3
100,000 - 500,000 17.7
Less than 100,000 14.6
Primarily rural 34.4
Almost half of the respondents had practiced lawformore than 10 years, more than a quarterfor5
to 10 years, and the rest for less than 5 years. Approximately three-fourths of the respondents
practiced primarily in state jurisdictions and about one-fourth specialized in federal practice.
Lawyers from all states, except Alaska, and from Guam, the Canal Zone, and Toronto
submitted substantive responses. The response rates of judges and law professors were
somewhat lower than that of the practicing attorneys. Information in this survey comes from: all
federal circuit courts; federal district courts of numerous areas including the metropolitan areas
of Boston, New York, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Norfolk, New Orleans, Miami,
Cleveland, St. Louis, Kansas City, Chicago, Denver, San Francisco, and Los Angeles; and state
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questionnaire after two mailings and a telephone followup by the
Survey Research Laboratory of the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. 12 The research-interviews and survey-shows signifi-
cant problems faced on a daily basis by criminal justice professionals
and provides a basis in reality for theoretical discussions of
conspiracy law.
THE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY
THE BASIC DEFINITION
Criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons
formed for the purpose of committing a crime. 13 The basic definition
is straightforward enough. 14 Legitimate protest goes not to the
definition of the crime, but, as will be seen, to its application and to
the evidence necessary to prove the existence of the agreement.
Nevertheless, the bare definition raises more questions than it
answers, both on a theoretical level and a practical level: What is an
agreement? Can someone be guilty of conspiracy if one of the
conspirators is legally unable to enter into an agreement? Can one
become a conspirator after the object crime is completed? The
answers to these questions depend on the reasons for the crime of
conspiracy.
courts in Ohio, Illinois, California, New York, and Texas. In addition, professors atlaw schools in
virtually every part of the country submitted replies.
12. The breakdown in substantive replies by category of respondents is:
Number of
Category respondents
Prosecutors (federal and state) 366
Defense attorneys 267
Federal trial judges 67
Federal and state appellate judges 53
Law professors 69
Total 822
Another 160 persons responded, but did not possess the data to enable them to answer the
questionnaire.
13. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §371 (1970).
Whether the object of the conspiracy must be a crime is still an open question. See text
accompanying notes 145-62 infra.
14. Others have disagreed in the past: "In the long category of crimes there is none, not
excepting criminal attempt, more difficult to confine within the boundaries of definitive statement
than conspiracy." Harno, supra note 3, at 624.
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THEORETICAL PURPOSES
Criminalization of conspiracy performs two functions. The first
function is that performed by any inchoate offense-the interruption
of criminal activity prior to its completion. At least in theory,
conspiracy subjects the defendant to criminal sanctions at a stage
earlier than any other offense, even attempt. "[Elvery criminal
conspiracy is not an attempt. One may become guilty of conspiracy
long before his act has come so dangerously near to completion as to
make him criminally liable for the attempted crime." 15The courts
rarely have stated the rationale for this early sanction, although a few
commentators have offered justifications for it, arguing that
individuals who band together have expressed, immediately upon
their agreement, a clear intent to violate society's laws. 16 Also, it is
argued that when more than one person agrees to engage in the
criminal activity, the likelihood of the accomplishment of the crime is
increased. 17
The second function is protection against group criminality; many
have argued that a conspiratorial agreement itself creates grave
dangers for society that should give rise to criminal sanctions. Justice
Gibson of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in 1821:
The effort of an individual to disturb this equilibrium can
never be perceptible, nor carry the operation of his interest
on that of any other individual, beyond the limits of fair
competition; but the increase of power by combination of
means, being in geometrical proportion to the number
concerned, an association may be able to give an impulse,
not only oppressive to individuals, but mischievous to the
public at large; and it is the employment of an engine so
powerful and dangerous, that gives criminality to an act
that would be perfectly innocent, at least in a legal view,
when done by an individual.' 8
15. Sayre, supra note 3, at 399.
16. Wechsler, Jones, & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Mlodel Penal Code of the
American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy (pt. 2), 61 COLUM. L. REv. 957, 965
(1961); see Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy: The State of Mind Crime-Intent, Proving Intent Anti-
Federal Intent 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 627, 628-29.
17. Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 924 ("[c]ollaboration
magnifies the risk to society both by increasing the likelihood that a given quantum of harm will be
successfully produced and by increasing the amount of harm that can be inflicted. A conspirator
who has committed himself to support his associates may be less likely to violate this commitment
than he would be to revise a purely private decision.").
18. Commonwealth ex reL Chew v. Carlisle, 1 Bright. N.P. 36, 41 (Pa. 1821).
1977]
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The Inchoate Offense. Those who argue that conspirators
have evidenced an early intent to commit a crime, upon agreement,
can point to no statistical evidence in support of their view.
Nevertheless, no statistical evidence can be raised on behalf of the
opposing view. Thus, we must content ourselves with asking only the
practical question: Do prosecutors need to rely on the possibility of
early intervention through conspiracy charges, or would attempt
charges handle inchoate conspiratorial group activities without the
accompanying evidentiary and practical problems for defendants? In
theory, attempt could not handle all these activities. Conspiracy is a
crime at the moment the agreement is formed, or at the moment some
minor act is taken in furtherance of that agreement.19 This is an
earlier stage of criminal activity than is required for attempt, which
usually involves either a substantial step toward the commission of
the contemplated crime, 2° or else "conduct that, in fact, amounts to
more than mere preparation for, and indicates . . . intent to
complete, the commission of the crime. 12 1 Regardless of whether
attempt could handle the inchoate conspiracy activities in theory, or
whether it would be desirable, 22 attempt would seem to be able to
handle those situations in which prosecutors actually charge
conspiracy.2 3 Conversations with prosecutors confirmed this. One
stated that "[no one will prosecute a case without an overt act;
generally there is at least an attempt unless you have an informant
which is the rare situation, for you find out about the conspiratorial
relationship from the overt act." 24 Another said that "[mlost
conspiracies [charged] do usually involve substantial steps." 25 Finally,
in the words of former Attorney General Ramsey Clark: "We don't
19. See Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 945-46 (statutes
commonly add overt act element to common law conspiracy).
20. E.g., State v. St. Christopher, 232 N.W.2d 798, 804 (Minn. 1975) (attempt requires
substantial step; preparation sufficient for conspiracy); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4(a) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1976).
21. Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001 (1975).
22. Many of the attorneys I spoke with believed that attempt was a preferable way of handling
the inchoate conspiracy activities: "Attempt is a much more rational approach in handling the
inchoate offense aspect of the conspiracy case; too often conspiracy is used as a political charge or
in connection with informers." Interview with Thomas Decker, then Deputy Director of the
Federal Public Defender Project, Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 6, 1975).
23. Johnson, supra note 3, at 1162-63.
24. Interview with Dan Webb, then Chief of Special Prosecutions, United States Attorneys"
Office, Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 7, 1975).
25. Interview with Warren Reese, Chief Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, Cal.
(July 23, 1975); accord, Interview with David Harlan, Chief of Criminal Division, United States
Attorneys' Office, St. Louis, Mo. (Oct. 23, 1975) (proof of overt act normally involves showing of
"substantial step toward completion of the crime").
[Vol. 65:925
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need conspiracy. It's not effective against organized crime, and we
could handle the [inchoate] offense through the use of attempt."
26
The results from the survey also indicate that the crime of attempt
could deal with most situations in which conspiracy currently is
charged.
Question 1: What would be the impact of doing away with
conspiracy and utilizing attempt crimes in its place?
27
Great Some Little or Some Great
reduction reduction no effect increase increase
in convictions in convictions on convictions in convictions in convictions
Prosecution 18.8 45.6 28.4 6.3 0.9
Defense attorneys 21.0 49.2 20.6 8.5 0.8
Appellate judges 16.7 62.5 18.8 2.1 -
Trial judges 16.9 52.3 30.8 - -
Law professors 24.2 66.1 9.7 - -
Average for all 19.7 50.2 23.8 5.7 0.7
respondents
Thus, only about one-fifth of each group responding to the survey
thought there would be a significant reduction in the number of
convictions. The indication that prosecutors generally do not charge
conspiracy in the purely inchoate situations is shown further by the
prevailing view that requiring a substantial overt act would cause no
more than a small reduction in the number of convictions.
Question 2: What would be the effect of requiring, for
purposes of the overt act, a "substantial step" toward
commission of the crime?
Significant Small
reduction reduction No effect
Prosecutors 37.5 32.2 30.3
Defense attorneys 48.8 38.7 12.5
Appellate judges 29.2 39.6 31.3
Trial judges 24.2 39.4 36.4
Law professors 25.4 55.6 19.0
Average for all 38.7 37.5 23.9
respondents
26. Interview with Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the United States, in
Champaign, Ill. (Oct. 2, 1975).
27. The survey results are not presented here in the same order in which the questions were
asked. Questions have been renumbered here for ease of reference. All of the tables show
percentages of respondents in each category. The original survey is reprinted in full in Appendix
B.
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Some prosecutors with whom I spoke expressed concern about
requiring a substantial overt act, 2 but they do not believe that many
conspiracy charges involve insignificant overt acts. Consequently, it
would seem that a general attempt statute could readily handle the
inchoate aspect of most conspiracy offenses. One possible explana-
tion for the heavy use of conspiracy in the federal system is the lack of
a general attempt section in the United States Code. 29 Although the
proposed revised federal criminal code would include such a
section, 30 few prosecutors or defense attorneys foresee immediate
changes in the use of conspiracy in connection with the inchoate
function.
Group Danger. "When you have persons getting together and
agreeing to commit a crime, it usually does lead to the commission or
attempted commission of that crime. It takes no genius to conclude
that group criminal activities are very dangerous.' '31 Although the
inchoate aspect of conspiracy is important, the chief rationale for the
use of the crime concerns the group danger that the offense combats.
The argument that group activities are far more dangerous to society
than individual criminal activities has found repeated expression in
the Supreme Court, with its best statement on the subject being one
of its earliest:
For two or more to confederate and combine together to
commit or cause to be committed a breach of the criminal
laws is an offense of the gravest character, sometimes quite
outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of
the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to
subvert the laws, educating and preparing the conspirators
for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is
characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection,
28. "The agreement is the evil act; if we change the overt act requirement, then conspiracy as
an agreement offense is no longer distinct." Interview with Robert Habans, Jr., Chief of the
Criminal Division, United States Attorneys' Office, New Orleans, La. (Nov. 28, 1975).
29. See United States v. Rosa, 404 F. Supp. 602, 607 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (attempt to commit
federal offense is itself offense only when specific statute includes attempt), affld, 535 F.2d 1248
(3d Cir. 1976) (unpublished per curiam opinion). There are specific attempt statutes governing
certain crimes. E.g., 21 U.S.C. §846 (1970) (drug offenses).
30. The Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1001 (1975)
provides: "A person is guilty of an offense if, acting with the state of mind required for the
commission of a crime, he intentionally engaged in conduct that, in fact, amounts to more than
mere preparation for, and indicates his intent to complete, the commission of the crime."
31. Interview with Robert Ward, Assistant United States Attorney, San Francisco, Cal. (Dec.
12, 1975).
932 [Vol. 65:925
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requiring more time for its discovery, and adding to the
importance of punishing it when discovered. 32
The lower federal courts- and the state courts 34 have accepted this
principle wholly, as have most commentators. 35 No state or federal
prosecutors with whom I spoke would question this rationale.
Prosecutors insisted that group activity does pose a greater danger:
"The good reason for having the crime of conspiracy is to get the
serious and dangerous planners of crime, when there is more than one
person planning the act." 36 "Any crime committed by means of a
conspiracy shows premeditation, an intent to break the public peace;
32. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78,88 (1915). Even as vociferous a critic of certain
conspiracy practices as Justice Jackson adopted the rationale. See Krulewitch v. United States,
336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., with Frankfurter & Murphy, JJ., concurring) (sharply
criticizing prosecutorial practices but admitting that "the basic conspiracy principle has some
place in modem criminal law, because to unite, back of a criminal purpose, the strength,
opportunities and resources of many is obviously more dangerous andmore difficult to police than
the efforts of a lone wrongdoer").
33. E.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124,1152 (7th Cir.) (conspiracy separate from and
perhaps more reprehensible than substantive crime), cert denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United
States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755,766 (D.C. Cir.) (conspiracy increases power to do wrong, difficulty
of proof, and likelihood of terror), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973); United States v. Greer, 476
F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir. 1972) (society harmed by "conspiracy's very existence which the law
regards as making attainment of unlawful objectives more likely"), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 929
(1973).
34. E.g., State v. Westbrook, 79 Ariz. 116, 119, 285 P.2d 161, 163 (1954) (conspiracy more
difficult to detect; punishment more important); Steele v. State, 52 Del. 5, 7,151 A.2d 127, 131
(1959) (conspiracy more difficult to prove, often intended to prepare for future crimes; justifies
harsher sentence than object crime); Lane v. State, 259 Ind. 468, -, 288 N.E.2d 258, 260
(1972) (conspiracy is often more serious offense than commission of the contemplated crime and a
more severe penalty may be justified).
35. E.g., King, The Control of Organized Crime in America, 4 STAN. L. REv. 52, 59-61 (1951);
Norton, Conspiracy as a Military Offense, 1964 JAG J. 309, 310; Note, supra note 3, at 283-84;
Comment, Criminal Conspiracy, 16 ST. Louis U. L. REv. 254,257 (1971); Comment, Conspiracyin
the Proposed Federal Criminal Code: Too Little Reformn, 47 TUL.L. REv. 1017,1019 (1973). Contra,
Goldstein, supra note 3, at 414. Goldstein strongly challenged the assumption that conspiracy
involves increased danger to society:
Though these assumed dangers from conspiracy have a romantically in-
dividualistic ring, they have never been verified empirically.. . .More likely,
empirical investigation would disclose that there is as much reason to believe that a
large number of participants will increase the prospect that the plan will be leaked
as that it will be kept secret; or that the persons involved will share their
uncertainties and dissuade each other as that each will stiffen the others'
determination.... ITihe goals of the group and the personalities of its members
would make any generalization unsafe and hence require some other explanation for
treating conspiracy as a separate crime in all cases.
* Id.
36. Interview with Florence Linn, Assistant Project Administrator, Bureau of Special
Operations, Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office (July 16, 1975).
HeinOnline -- 65 Geo. L. J. 977 1976-1977
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
this is not the average criminal. An armed robber by himself is not as
dangerous as an armed robber conspiring with someone else."37
Discussions of the group danger problems with prosecutors left a
nagging question. The group danger argument is correct in many
cases, but is the danger always or even usually present? Despite the
almost casual assurances of the added danger, that danger was not
very strongly reflected in the responses to the survey.
Question 3: With which one of the following statements are
you the most in agreement?
There is a greater danger in conspiracy because of the
encouragement and aid that conspirators give each other.
There is less danger in conspiracy because of the
possibilities of infiltration by undercover officers and disagree-
ment among conspirators.
Neither of the above, depends on the fact situation.
Neither,
Greater danger Less danger depends on facts
Prosecutors 28.3 2.7 69.0
Defense attorneys 10.5 5.5 84.0
Appellate judges 18.8 - 81.3
Trial judges 12.3 1.5 86.2
Law professors 28.4 1.5 70.1
Average for all 20.5 3.2 76.3
respondents
One may question whether the broad rationale of group danger
supports the need for conspiracy to prosecute all group criminal
activities. What one cannot question, however, is that some
conspiracies are extremely dangerous and that a strong doctrine is
needed to combat them. 38 As to such dangerous groups, is the use of
37. Interview with Frederick Whisman, Assistant District Attorney, San Francisco, Cal. (Dec.
12, 1975).
38. Whether or not group action is per se more dangerous than individual activity, many
conspiracies pose serious threats because they involve large criminal enterprises. Organized
crime is said to be the world's largest business, taking profits of 7 to 10 billion dollars annually.
Organized Crime Control, Hearings on 8.30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1970) (statement of Representative
McCulloch); see Letter from the Honorable J. Edward Lumbard, Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, to the author, at 1 (Apr. 12, 1976) (copy on file at the Georgetown
Law Journal) ("The more efficient means of travel and communication available today to
lawbreakers has spawned many criminal endeavors which are opeiated by larger organized
934 [Vol. 65:925
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the conspiracy charge the way to stop them? Prosecutors certainly
believe so. They constantly made the point that they need a
conspiracy statute to go after these group danger activities because
nothing else would do the job adequately:
We need conspiracy. I know there is strong reaction from
the defense bar, but I always argue that but for the
conspiracy statute some serious inchoate offenders would
be going free, and these are dangerous individuals. I know
these cases may be difficult, perhaps more difficult than
they should be, to defend, but I don't accept the notion that
we ought not to have conspiracy.
39
One viewed conspiracy as a means to get "fringe types" by
broadening the scope of the offense. 40 To another,
[i]t is important to retain the conspiracy offense
as . . . with a network conspiracy it allows the jury to see
the-whole story. For instance, in the C. Arnholt Smith
prosecution there were 1000 counts of conspiracy so it was
necessary for the trier of fact to understand the full
implications of the case. 41
Most defense counsel are unwilling to challenge the underlying
assumption that group criminal actions are more dangerous than
individual acts. Many, however, are quite willing to challenge the view
that prosecutors need conspiracy to combat such group activity.
4 2
They feel "that the prosecution just does not need conspiracy, as long
as they can use the underlying theory of conspiracy for getting
evidence in," 43 or that "inchoate and substantive offenses take care of
all the dangers involved in the so-called conspiracy situations." 1
4
groups than was the case years ago."). I am indebted to Judge Lumbard, who, in addition to
responding to the questionnaire, wrote to set forth "several important considerations which it is
not possible to emphasize sufficiently in such answers [to the questionnaire]." Id.
39. Interview with Jeffrey White, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Md. (Nov. 29,
1975).
40. Interview with Ralph Capitelli, Deputy District Attorney, New Orleans, La. (Nov. 26,
1975).
41. Interview with Warren P. Reese, Chief Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, Cal.
(July 23, 1975); accord, Interview with Terry Knoepp, District Attorney's Office, San Diego, Cal.
(July 23, 1975) ("In order to get the true planned crime, we need conspiracy to show the scope of
the offense.").
42. See notes 31-41 supra and accompanying text.
43. Interview with John Cleary, Federal Public Defender, San Diego, Cal. (Dec. 22, 1975).
44. Interview with George Cotsirilos, defense attorney, Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 7, 1975).
9351977]
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The conflicting comments from the two sides raise the difficult
question whether prosecutors actually need the conspiracy charge
generally. This question ought not to be asked rhetorically, however,
for prosecutors use the conspiracy charge in a manner that adds fuel
to the position of the defense counsel. In many, if not most, cases in
which criminal conspiracy is charged, the defendants either have
committed or have attempted a substantive offense. In the interviews,
both prosecutors and defense counsel agreed upon this and to a
degree the survey substantiated their agreement. Less than 10% of the
respondents believe that conspiracy charges are not coupled with a
charge on a substantive offense in the vast majority of cases. 4 5 Even in
the cases in whicfconspiracy alone is charged, many prosecutors and
half of the trial judges believe that the defendants had completed or
attempted the object crime.4 6
45. Question 4: What percentage of conspiracy charges is for conspiracy only and not in
conjunction with a substantive or completed offense?
0 - 10 11-25 26-50 51-75 76-90 91-100
percent percent percent percent percent percent
Prosecutors 83.7 6.4 4.1 1.5 1.2 3.2
Defense attorneys 75.3 16.9 4.7 0.8 0.4 2.0
Appellate judges 77.3 15.9 6.8 .. .. ..
Trial judges 73.8 21.5 4.6 .. .. ..
Law professors 50.0 30.8 15.4 -- 3.8 --
Average for all 77.3 13.4 5.3 0.9 0.9 2.1
respondents
46. Question 5: In whatpercentage of cases where conspiracy alone was charged had the
object crime been completed or attempted?
0-10 11-25 26-50 51-75 76-90 91-100
percent percent percent percent percent percent
Prosecutors 62.7 5.8 5.5 3.7 6.7 15.6
Defense attorneys 48.8 11.0 8.9 5.7 9.8 15.9
Appellate judges 31.6 2.6 15.8 10.5 18.4 21.1
Trial judges 24.2 6.5 9.7 9.7 24.2 25.8
Law professors 27.1 16.7 14.6 8.3 20.8 12.5
Average for all 50.6 8.2 8.2 5.5 10.8 16.6
respondents
This table is puzzling. For example, it is hard to explain why one-fourth of the trialIjudges believe
that the substantive offense almost always had been completed or attempted and one-fourth
believe it almost never had. One explanation is that prosecutorial practices may vary widely
across the country: some prosecutors' offices may never charge conspiracy unless there is at least
a substantial overt act; others may not charge conspiracy at all if they can charge the substantive
offense or attempt.
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That prosecutors often do, or could, charge conspiracy along with
other offenses should not be surprising. Unless there is an informant
or wiretap, the government often does not discover the conspiracy
until some criminal act has occurred. Yet, if the group has committed
or attempted a substantive offense, the need for using a conspiracy
charge against the group is unclear. Any conspirator who has helped
plan the crime would be responsible for the completed offense under
an accountability theory. 47 Moreover, every person whom the
prosecution could charge as a conspirator could be brought to trial for
the completed or attempted crime and the prosecution could have the
full scope of the endeavor explained to the jury. The conclusion is
unavoidable that no persuasive rationale generally supports charging
a conspiracy when another offense is available, and no attorney with
whom I spoke articulated any rationale. 48 To be sure, the comments I
heard ran along the lines of: "I can see no reason at all to have
conspiracy when there is a substantive offense; ' 49 or "[i]f the
substantive offense has been completed, I see no need for the crime of
conspiracy." 5 0
The traditional premise for convicting a defendant of both
conspiracy and the completed or attempted crime is that the
agreement to commit the crime, in and of itself, is a significant danger
to society. Society, however, should not fear the agreement per se, but
rather the likelihood that a completed or attempted crime will result.
If the group has attempted or completed the crime that is the object
of the conspiracy, the basis for prosecution and punishment for the
agreement is destroyed because society can punish the conspirators
for the attempted or completed crime. , Moreover, even if there were
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1970) ("Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.").
48. But see Letter from the Honorable J. Edward Lumbard, supra note 38, at 2. Judge
Lumbard stated:
In any event, I do not see how anyone can seriously argue that itis overreaching or
any sort of abuse of prosecutorial power to add the charge of conspiracy in such
cases, or for that matter, in any case where it can be shown that two or more persons
acted together in committing, or planning to commit a crime. The fact that certain
prosecutors have used bad judgment in how certain cases, such as the Chicago
Seven case, were handled should not blind us to the proper advantage of conspiracy
prosecutions and the public interest which may be so served.
49. Interview with Tom Decker, then Deputy Director of the Federal Public Defender Project,
Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 6, 1975).
50. Interview with Robert Thompson and David Rinstitt, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney,
Marion County, Indianapolis, Ind. (Oct. 30, 1975).
51. Illinois provides that a defendant cannot be convicted of both conspiracy and the object
crime. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §8-5 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
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some theoretical justification for the double prosecution view, there is
little practical justification. Virtually no one convicted of both the
conspiracy and the object offense is punished separately for each
offense. 52 Not a single person whom I interviewed could recall more
than a rare case in which consecutive sentencing was ordered. The
responses to Question 6 also show that consecutive sentencing is
rarely employed.
Question 6: When a defendant is convicted on both the
conspiracy charge and the substantive charge, what per-
centage of the time is consecutive sentencing employed?
0-10 11-25 26-50 51-75 76-90 91-100
percent percent percent percent percent percent
Prosecutors 81.9 5.1 2.7 2.0 2.0 6.1
Defense attorneys 77.3 10.5 2.9 1.7 3.8 3.8
Appellate judges 71.7 6.5 4.3 4.3 2.2 10.9
Trial judges 78.8 6.1 1.5 3.0 1.5 9.1
Law professors 73.3 8.9 6.7 4.4 2.2 4.4
Average for all 78.8 7.4 3.1 2.3 2.6 5.8
respondents
PRACTICAL PURPOSES
If the theoretical basis for convicting persons of both the
substantive offense and the conspiracy is not supportable, and if in
practice the conspirator rarely receives consecutive sentences, why do
prosecutors charge and attempt to prove two offenses at trial? Surely
there must be an advantage to counteract the disadvantages of time
consumption and confusion engendered by more complex jury
instructions. According to defense counsel, the advantage is higher
conviction rates. Although few prosecutors say that the chance of
conviction improves when an indictment includes more than one
count against the conspirator, the survey supports the defense view.
52. Unlike statutes in some states, federal law allows consecutive sentencing, and the Supreme
Court has upheld consecutive sentencing for conspiracy and the object offense. Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946). The proposed revision of the federal criminal code
codifies consecutive sentencing. Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S. 1,94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§2304(a) (1975).
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The responses indicate that the conviction rate goes up, to some
degree, on each count if both go to the jury.-3
Question 8: How does the conviction rate for a conspiracy
charge change when charged and tried along with a substantive
count?54
Much Somewhat Somewhat Much
greater greater Same less less
Prosecutors 13.9 28.3 48.3 5.6 3.9
Defense attorneys 27.6 39.5 23.2 4.9 4.9
Appellate judges 14.7 23.5 47.1 2.9 11.8
Trial judges 16.4 27.3 52.7 3.6 -
Law professors 21.1 52.6 13.2 7.9 5.3
Average for all 19.9 33.9 36.6 5.1 4.5
respondents
53. This situation arises fairly often when two or more persons are brought to trial:
Question 7: When two or more persons are brought to trial for a substantive felony,
what percent of the time are they also brought to trial on a conspiracy charge?
0-10 11-25 26-50 51-75 76-90 91-100
percent percent percent percent percent percent
Prosecutors 88.1 5.0 3.6 0.8 1.1 1.4
Defense attorneys 61.7 11.5 8.4 5.7 8.0 4.6
Appellate judges 31.0 26.2 19.0 11.9 9.5 2.4
Trial judges 16.9 26.2 21.5 15.4 12.3 7.7
Law professors 60.0 16.0 6.0 12.0 6.0 --
Average for all 68.5 10.8 7.7 5.0 5.1 2.9
respondents
A higher frequency is reflected in the responses of the more experienced conspiracy lawyers, the
federal practitioners:
0-10 11-25 26-50 51-75 76-90 91-100
percent percent percent "percent percent percent
Prosecutors 33.3 33.3 16.7 10.0 3.3 3.3
Defense attorneys 8.8 8.8 11.8 17.6 26.5 26.5
54. The figures in the response table do not include 29.3% (221) of the respondents, who were
uncertain.
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Question 9: How does the conviction rate for a substantive
count change when charged and tried along with a conspiracy
count?55
Much Somewhat Somewhat Much
greater greater Same less less
Prosecutors 3.1 29.2 63.0 4.7 -
Defense attorneys 30.4 32.6 31.0 3.8 2.2
Appellate judges 2.8 33.3 58.3 2.8 2.8
Trial judges 6.9 32.8 58.6 1.7 -
Law professors 13.2 34.2 42.1 10.5 -
Average for all 14.2 31.5 49.0 4.3 1.0
respondents
A conspiracy count therefore may strongly aid the prosecution's
case. For example, statements of a conspirator made during the
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy are excepted from the
definition of hearsay and are admissible against all conspirators."
Venue for a federal conspiracy trial may lie in any district in which the
55. The figures in the response table do not include 27.3% (224) of the respondents, who were
uncertain.
56. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E); Note, The United States Courts Of Appeals: 1975-1976 Term
CriminalLaw andProcedure, 65 GEo.L.J. 201,428 & n.1467 (1976). The out-of-court declaration
of a coconspirator may be used as substantive evidence against the defendant as long as the
declaration was made during the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of it. Anderson v.
United States, 417 U.S. 211,218-19 (1974). The rationale forthis exception to the hearsay rule is
that the coconspirators are agents of one another, and any such statementby one is the statement
of all. Id. at 218 n.6; Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert.
denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926). The significant impact of the hearsay exception on convictions is
almost universally accepted.
Question 10: What would be the result of eliminating the hearsay exception in cases
where conspiracy is charged or where it is the uncharged basis for the charged crime?
Significant
reduction Small reduction
in convictions in convictions No effect
Prosecutors 61.7 24.4 14.0
Defense attorneys 72.1 22.7 5.2
Appellate judges 56.5 32.6 10.9
Trial judges 42.4 49.2 8.5
Law professors 51.8 42.9 5.4
Average for all 62.6 27.8 9.6
respondents
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conspiracy began, continued, or ended. 57 The survey shows that these
advantages are important, but it also establishes that other reasons
encourage prosecutors to charge conspiracy: the reaction of the jury
or judge to the alleged danger of group activity, jurors' confusion that
may lead them to convict all defendants, longer sentences, and
improved plea bargaining positions. 58 Other less frequently men-
tioned advantages include easier joinder of defendants and offenses,
incentives for certain defendants to turn state's evidence, and time
and expenses saved. Question 12 was directed to past and present
prosecutors.
57. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1914); 18 U.S.C. §3237(a) (1970). The
prosecution of Harry Reems on obscenity charges shows the way in which a conspiracy charge can
help a prosecutor find a receptive forum for prosecuting unpopular crimes. Reems starred in the
movie "Deep Throat," and was prosecuted in Memphis, Tennessee, although he was paid little
for his performance and allegedly did not know that others would distribute the film in Memphis.
58. Question 11: What do you feel is the greatest advantage(s) for the prosecution in
conspiracy trials involving more than one defendant? (Circle all that apply.)
Reaction
of trier
Admissibility Admissibility of fact Confusion
of hearsay of acts of to group of trier
evidence coconspirators danger of fact Venue Other
Prosecutors 45.1 77.2 24.1 4.0 9.9 14.5
Defense attorneys 65.0 76.8 31.9 53.1 5.9 10.2
Appellate judges 38.8 81.6 16.3 18.4 2.0 10.2
Trial judges 48.5 81.8 13.6 10.6 3.0 4.5
Law professors 67.7 73.8 46.2 49.2 20.0 16.9
Average for all 53.6 77.4 27.2 25.9 8.3 12.1
respondents
Some lawyers did question whether there was any special advantage for the prosecution in
conspiracy trials. One United States attorney argued that asking questions about prosecutorial
advantages misses the point of conspiracy charges.
The advantages to the prosecution are the same as those to the cause of justice and
its administration-the prosecution in a single trial of persons engaged in a joint
criminal venture. To do otherwise would be to subject the courts to a succession of
repetitive trials using the same witnesses with an ever-expanding supply of previous
testimony for cross-examination.
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Question 12: What motivated you to bring a conspiracy
charge where the object offense had been completed or
attempted? (Circle all that apply.)
Evidentiary Venue Possibility Advantages in Other G0
advantages considerations 59  of connection with
greater plea bargaining
sentence
Prosecutors 62.8 12.7 17.5 35.3 26.3
Defense attorneys 67.8 4.4 17.8 35.6 28.9
Appellate judges 68.8 12.5 - 6.3 37.5
Trial judges 78.3 17.4 8.7 13.0 21.7
Law professors 59.1 4.5 27.3 22.7 50.0
Average for all 64.5 11.0 17.0 32.8 28.0
respondents
59. The responses to specific questions indicate further that venue is neither a great
advantage to the prosecutor nor a great disadvantage to the defendant in most cases:
Question 13: What would be the impact, in a multidistrict conspiracy, of allowing
prosecution only in the district where the agreement was made as opposed to allowing
prosecution where any overt act occurred?
Severely limit Hamper prosecution
prosecution to some extent No effect
Prosecutors 34.9 44.9 20.2
Defense attorneys 12.0 53.9 34.0
Appellate judges 17.4 52.2 30.4
Trial judges 20.6 50.8 28.6
Law professors 17.2 50.0 32.8
Average for all 23.5 49.3 27.2
respondents
Question 14: How often does the ability of prosecution to establish venue in places
other than where the agreement was formed actually disadvantage defendants?
Often Sometimes Seldom Never
Prosecutors 4.7 36.9 40.7 17.6
Defense attorneys 22.9 44.1 24.6 8.5
Appellate judges 4.4 42.2 51.1 2.2
Trial judges 3.6 36.4 52.7 7.3
Law professors 19.3 52.6 28.1 --
Average for all 12.1 41.0 35.8 11.2
respondents
60. The additional reasons most often given were that the object crime could not necessarily be
proven at trial and that, as one United States attorney remarked in a letter responding to the
survey, "the overriding consideration in bringing a conspiracy charge [is] that the evidence
available to the prosecution which willbest [elucidate] for the jury the alleged criminal conduct is a
conspiracy charge." Finally, a number of prosecutors answered this question by saying that
conspiracy was charged because the legislature has made conspiracy a crime. In light of
prosecutorial discretion and the rare use of consecutive sentencing, these responses are rather
curious.
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"Beware! Anyone charged with participation in a conspiracy will be
faced with a 'drag-net' capable of 'great oppression.' ' '61 The
commentator who made that statement characterized the defense
position that joint conspiracy trials62 sometimes result in unjust
verdicts. The survey indicates that juries do not often acquit some
defendants in large joint trials if they find others guilty.
Question 15: In what percent of cases does the jury convict
some but not all of the alleged conspirators?
0-10 11-25 26-50 51-75 76-90 91-100
percent percent percent percent percent percent
Prosecutors 66.9 15.9 10.3 3.8 2.1 1.0
Defense attorneys 43.5 25.7 21.7 5.7 3.0 0.4
Appellate judges 30.8 15.4 41.0 12.8 - -
Trial judges 24.2 38.7 22.6 6.5 8.1 -
Law professors 9.5 40.5 33.3 7.1 9.5 -
Average for all 49.0 22.9 18.7 5.4 3.3 0.6
respondents
Of course, one can explain the responses as only reflecting the
prosecutor's care in not charging innocent people with conspiracy, but
many defense counsel made the point that in large conspiracy cases if
the prosecution shows some evidence of a conspiracy, juries have a
difficult time distinguishing defendants, and juries occasionally make
erroneous judgments as to particular defendants. 63 These points have
61. Klein, Conspiracy-The Prosecutor's Darling, 24 BROOKL.N L. REV. 1, 3 (1957) (citing
United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579,581 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940)).
62. The general rule is that persons jointly indicted should be tried together, especially in
conspiracy cases. United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945
(1973); United States v. Kulp, 365 F. Supp. 747,765 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affdper curiam, 497 F.2d
921 (3d Cir. 1974).
63. Question 16: Do you agree or disagree with this statement: As the number of
defendants in a joint conspiracy trial increases, there is a greater chance that all of the
defendants will be convicted,
Agree Disagree
Prosecutors 25.3 74.7
Defense attorneys 48.2 51.8
Appellate judges 29.2 70.8
Trial judges 18.5 81.5
Law professors 35.6 64.4
Average for all 33.7 66.3
respondents
Confusion in the minds of the jurors causing them to convict all defendants was thought to be a
major advantage in prosecuting conspiracy cases by 25.9% of the respondents. See Survey
Question 11, supra note 58.
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been made before. Indeed, great concern was expressed over fifty
years ago by the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges.6"
More importantly, the interviews consistently indicated that the
mechanics of large conspiracy cases result in disruptive trials that
cast doubt on the integrity of the whole system of criminal justice.
Although few cases tried today involve thirty or more defendants, as
was common not so long ago, 66 large trials still often occur. 67 Wholly
apart from the huge joint trials of the past, most attorneys with whom
I spoke felt that having five or six defendants in a single trial creates
significant mechanical problems.
Recognition of these problems has led many prosecutors and trial
judges to sever cases sua sponte, but virtually every prosecutor I met
challenged the defense attorneys' general conclusion; indeed, some
prosecutors feared just the opposite result. Jeffrey White, Assistant
United States Attorney in Baltimore, said: "If six defendants out of
twenty-five go to trial, it's a lot. If many more we probably would want
64. The Supreme Court has noted the concerns and pledged to "viewwith disfavor any attempt
to broaden the already pervasive and wide sweepingnetof conspiracy prosecution." Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391,404 (1957). Justice Jackson argued almost 30 years ago that"loose
practice as to this offense constitutes a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice."
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,446 (1948) (Jackson, J., with Frankfurter & Murphy,
JJ., concurring).
65. We note the prevalent use of conspiracy indictments for converting a joint
misdemeanor into a felony; and we express our conviction that both for this purpose
and for the purpose-or at least with the effect-of bringing in much improper
evidence, the conspiracy statute is being much abused.
...We observe so many conspiracy prosecutions which do not have the
substantial base that we fear the creation of a general impression very harmful to
law enforcement, that this method of prosecution is used arbitrarily and harshly.
[19251 ATry GEN. ANN. REP. 5-6.
66. See, e.g., Butlerv. United States, 317 F.2d 249,251 (8th Cir.) (30 defendants inmailfraud),
cert denied, 375 U.S. 838 (1963); Capriola v. United States, 61 F.2d 5, 6 (2d Cir. 1932) (59
defendants in conspiracy to violate Prohibition Act), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 671 (1933); People v.
Heidt, 312 Mich. 629, 633, 20 N.W.2d 751,752 (1945) (69 defendants in conspiracy to obstruct
justice); People v. Roxborough, 307 Mich. 575,588,12 N.W.2d 466,471 (1943) (61 defendants in
conspiracy to obstruct justice), cert denied, 323 U.S. 749 (1944).
67. Question 17: Have the mnajority ofjoint conspiracy trials that you are aware of had...
Less than 5 5-10 More than 10
defendants defendants defendants
Prosecutors 92.1 7.2 0.7
Defense attorneys 76.6 21.8 1.6
Appellate judges 77.8 22.2
Trial judges 74.2 25.8
Law professors 79.6 18.5 1.9
Average for all 83.2 15.8 1.0
respondents
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a severance; there would be too much confusion for everyone, and
frankly I would have a fear of wholesale acquittal in that sort of
situation."68 Most prosecutors stated that they believe that juries can
differentiate among defendants and charges. 69 Some defense counsel
reply that the examples of cases in which juries distinguished
defendants involved outrageously misplaced defendants. The opinion
of Robert Kasanof of New York, a former teacher of criminal law and
the head of a legal aid office, is that:
Question 18: What is the largest conspiracy tria4 insofar as number of defendants in a
joint trial, that you have handled or know of from personal knowledge?
More
2-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 than 40
defendants defendants defendants defendants defendants
Prosecutors 90.7 7.6 1.7 ....
Defense attorneys 68.0 19.6 8.0 2.0 2.4
Appellate judges 41.7 29.2 14.6 6.3 8.3
Trial judges 35.8 37.3 16.4 3.0 7.5
Law professors 54.7 24.5 .7.5 5.7 7.5
Average for all 71.4 17.4 6.6 1.8 2.7
respondents
The figures reflect only the defendants who actually go to trial; normally, the number is higher
because many defendants will enter into plea bargaining agreements. Interview with Robert
Brosio, Chief Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, Cal. (Dec. 16, 1975). See also
United States v. Verdoorm, 528 F.2d 103,107 (8th Cir. 1976) (rejecting claim that Government's
offers during plea bargaining should be admitted to show weakness of Government's case).
The interviews also showed that large trials remain commonplace. Attorneys in most large
cities recalled recent cases involving a dozen or more defendants.
68. Interview with Jeffrey White, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Md. (Nov. 29,
1975).
69. E.g., Interview with Robert Habans, Chief of the Criminal Division, United States
Attorneys' Office, New Orleans, La. (Nov. 28, 1975). See generally Letter from the Honorable J.
Edward Lumbard, supra note 38, at 2. Judge Lumbard stated:
Whether or not juries can determine the guilt or innocence of particular
defendants in multi-defendant cases depends on the competence of counsel and
most of all on the trial judge. In the cases coming before us for review we have found
that the jurors are discriminating and that they exercise great care. Just last Friday,
in the SDNY, Judge Duffy finished a nine-weeks conspiracy trial of 12 defendants
on narcotics charges. The jury deliberated from Monday until Friday evening,
sending 43 communications to the judge regarding testimony as to various
defendants. The jury convicted seven defendants for conspiracy and various
substantive crimes, and at the same time some of the seven were acquitted of one or
more substantive offenses. One defendant was acquitted, and the jury disagreed as
to the guilt of four defendants. Such a trial and such an outcome are not the
exception.
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Large numbers of defendants at trial make for a ridiculous
situation. Even with eight or nine defendants at a
conspiracy trial involving a long-term conspiracy, the case
could run for three months or more. No attorney will be able
to remember all the evidence. The notion that the jurors will
sort out that evidence against each defendant as to acts
that he agreed to is ridiculous. What can you hope for? Who
is kidding whom? In all the jury cases I have had with
conspiracy, the jury, after about an hour of deliberation,
always asks for the conspiracy instruction again; they don't
really understand the conspiracy. 70
This statement echoes one made by Judge Jerome Frank decades
ago:
We judges ought to take judicial notice of what every
ordinary person knows about juries, and therefore to
recognize that the twelve citizens, casually summoned to
serve as jurors, are not trained fact-finders and can be
easily bewildered. . . . The need for safeguarding defend-
ants from misunderstanding by the jury is peculiarly acute
in conspiracy trials.... 71
Despite the criticisms, little has changed over the years.
Although the prosecutors' position that juries can and regularly do
distinguish between defendants is true, a dragnet effect does taint
some trials. Guilt by association is a justified fear. It is hard to believe
that in a four-month trial involving many defendants the jury can sift
all the evidence and differentiate between the defendants. Having
explored this possible dragnet effect and other practical reasons for
prosecutors to charge conspiracy, why and when federal prosecutors
charge conspiracy is somewhat predictable.
THE PROSECUTOR'S DARLING?
For years it has been widely assumed that criminal conspiracy is
charged very often throughout the United States. This assumption, at
least on the federal level, appears to be basically correct. Neither the
70. Interview with Robert Kasanof, former teacher of criminal law and head of a legal aid
office, in New York City (Jan. 19, 1976).
71. United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1003 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 773 (1943).
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Department of Justice nor the Federal Judicial Center keeps
complete statistics on how often conspiracy is charged,72 but what
statistics are available indicate that it is one of the most commonly
charged crimes. 73 Many prosecution and defense attorneys stated
that federal prosecutors generally will include a conspiracy charge
whenever a case involves multiple defendants. 14 Prosecutors in some
federal jurisdictions charge conspiracy considerably more often than
do others. San Diego, a focal point for narcotics smuggling and
immigration violations, probably has as many conspiracy prosecu-
tions as any federal district in the country. 7 5 Considering the practical
benefits of charging conspiracy, it is not surprising that federal
prosecutors charge it so often. What is surprising, however, is that
federal prosecutors charge conspiracy so much more often than do
their state counterparts.
Question 19: What percentage of felonies charged in your
district-isfoi the crime of conspiracy?76
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 50+
percent percent percent percent percent percent
Federal lawyers: 39.0 18.6 11.9 6.8 15.3 8.5
State lawyers: 90.0 6.9 1.7 0.8 0.4 0.4
72. Interview with Richard Thornbrugh, Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division), in
Washington, D.C. ("Statistics just are not available to determine how often the crime of
conspiracy is charged, primarily because we do not regard the crime as unique in any form.").
73. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATroRNEYS' OFFICES STATISTICAL REPoRT-FIscAL
YEAR 1975 Table 3 (842 conspiracy cases with 2,186 defendants filed in fiscal 1975; 16th largest
category of offense).
74. E.g., Interview with Robert Brosio, Chief Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles,
Cal. (Dec. 16, 1975) ("In virtually every multiple defendant case there is a conspiracy charge,
except those cases where the substantive offense does not involve any serious conspiracy, such as
bank robbery or check theft.").
75. Interview with Warren P. Reese, Chief Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, Cal.
(July 23, 1975).
76. The breakdown between prosecution and defense continues to reflect the different
perceptions of the two groups on the frequency of conspiracy charges.
Federal
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 50+
percent percent percent percent percent percent
Prosecution
Defense
60.7 28.6 3.6 -- 7.1 --
19.4 9.7 19.4 12.9 22.6 16.1
1977]
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Thus, although 90% of the state practitioners believed that a
conspiracy charge was present less than 10% of the time, more than
40% of the federal practitioners thought conspiracy charges
accounted for at least one-fifth of all the felonies charged.77
The contrast between state and federal practices is also demon-
strated by the responses to a survey question concerning the
likelihood that two or more persons charged with a substantive
offense would also be charged with conspiracy. Ninety-three percent
of the state prosecutors believe that this happens less than 10% of the
time, but two-thirds of the federal prosecutors believe it occurs more
than 10% of the time. Half of the federal defense attorneys believe it
occurs more than three-fourths of the time. 78
The survey and conversations across the country make it clear that
state prosecutors rarely charge conspiracy. 79 Although no procedural
State
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 50+
percent percent percent percent percent percent
Prosecution 96.9 1.8 0.9 .. .. 0.3
Defense 78.8 14.9 2.9 1.9 1.0 0.5
77. This pattern is also reflected in the responses from the judges. All of the state judges who
responded to this question believed that conspiracy was charged in less than 10% of all felony
cases, but the federal judges had a different experience:
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 50+
percent percent percent percent percent percent
Appellate judges 23.1 42.3 15.4 -- 11.5 7.7
Trial judges 36.4 27.3 18.2 3.6 9.1 5.5
78. Question 20: When two or more persons are brought to trial for a substantive felony,
what percent of the time are they also brought to trial on a conspiracy charge?
0-10 11-25 26-50 51-75 76-90 91-100
percent percent percent percent percent percent
Federal prosecutors 33.3 33.3 16.7 10.0 3.3 3.3
State prosecutors 93.4 2.4 2.1 -- 0.9 1.2
Federal defense 8.8 8.8 11.8 17.6 26.5 26.5
attorneys
State defense 71.1 11.5 8.3 3.7 4.6 0.9
attorneys
79. In the Providence, Rhode Island, Public Defender's Office, 6 of the 360 pending cases
involved conspiracy counts. Letter from Peter DiBiase, Assistant Public Defender, Providence,
Rhode Island, to author (Apr. 20, 1976) (copy on file at the Georgetown Law Journal). The Legal
Aid Society of Nassau County, New York, handles approximately 1000 felony cases per
year and less than 10 involve conspiracy counts. Letter from James J. McDonough, Attorney in
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advantages unique to the federal system are immediately discernible,
there are two reasons why conspiracy is charged so often in the
federal system and so rarely in the state systems. The first relates to
the type of offense typically charged in state jurisdictions-local,
violent crime. 8" Moreover, if conspiratorial combinations are involved,
they are less complex and less sophisticated than the cases generally
handled at the federal level. 8' Illegal businesses such as narcotics
smuggling, extortion, and transportation of illegal aliens often involve
elaborate transportation networks that are interstate in nature, thus
requiring federal action even when there is concurrent jurisdiction. 8 2
The nature of the crimes committed is a major reason for federal
prosecutors to charge conspiracy more often than state prosecutors,
but it cannot be the only reason. Many federal crimes do involve
planning and sophisticated coordination of large numbers of persons,
but conspiracy is often used in federal districts in connection with
narcotics offenses of every size-offenses that in the states as well as
the federal districts involve planning and distribution.
The second reason that seems to explain the difference in the use of
the charge has to do with the makeup of the prosecuting offices and
their backup staffs. The district attorneys' offices probably handle
more cases than United States attorneys' offices, 83 and their
investigative staffs are state or local police forces concerned more
Charge of the Legal Aid Society of Nassau County, New York, to author (Apr. 8, 1976) (copy on
file at the Georgetown Law Journal).
Of course, state prosecutors can utilize the conspiracy doctrine without formally charging
conspiracy. In the federal system and in most states, the evidentiary advantages as well as the
complicity rules apply if a conspiracy is proved, whether charged ornot. V. BALL, R. BARNHARTK.
BROUN, G. Dix, E. GELLHORN, R. MEISENHOLDER, E. ROBERTS, & J. STRONG, McCORMICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §267, at 646 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). Nonetheless, state
counsel made it clear that conspiracy was not being utilized in this manner to any great extent.
80. Interview with Lowell Jensen, District Attorney for Alameda County (Oakland), Cal. (late
1975) (few pure conspiracy charges).
81. See generally Abrams, Conspiracy and Multi- Venue in Federal Criminal Prosecutions: The
Crime Committed Formula, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 751 (1962).
82. See O'Dougherty, supra note 3, at 263 (federal conspiracy charges more common because
federal crimes not customarily "of the 'lone wolf' variety").
83. It is difficult to prove this observation statistically. Some state districts make distinctions
in determining case loads between appeals, habeas corpus matters, misdemeanors, felonies, and
so on. Trying to match these figures against the federal reporting system proved to be quite an
arduous task. The statistics published by federal and local prosecutors' offices with roughly the
same number of attorneys do indicate that each local attorney handles more cases than his federal
counterpart. Compare 1975 Annual Report to the Mayor of San Francisco (John Jay Ferdon,
District Attorney) (59 attorneys handled 1525 informations involving 1829 defendants and 73
indictments involving 101 defendants) with Report of Activities, United States Attorney,
Southern District of New York, June 1973 - October 1975 (between 60 and 68 attorneys filed
1233 cases infiscal 1975). Moreover, every attorneywith whom I spoke feltthat state prosecutors
did handle more criminal cases per attorney.
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with preventing crimes than with the investigation of complicated
criminal schemes. It is this latter function that federal agencies-for
example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Fire-
arms-perform so well. 84 Both prosecutors and defense counsel
stressed repeatedly the limited manpower and investigative assis-
tance of the state offices. 5 Despite these limitations, the interviews
indicate that state prosecutors are likely to begin charging conspiracy
more often, particularly with narcotics and white-collar offenses. The
reason given is that as crime becomes more sophisticated, state
prosecutors are discussing and carefully studying the favorable
conspiracy rules of evidence and complicity and are perceiving
conspiracy as an effective approach to serious criminal activities such
as narcotics, robbery, and consumer fraud and other white-collar
crimes.86 Perhaps at that future time we will begin to hear more from
state defense counsel on the subject of criminal conspiracy.
THE AGREEMENT
An understanding of the theoretical and practical purposes for the
crime of conspiracy is necessary for a close examination of the various
formulations of what constitutes a conspiracy and the practical result
of accepting a particular definition. The most interesting facets of
conspiracy doctrine are the requirements of a punishable agreement
and the prohibited objects of that agreement.
The crime of conspiracy is the illegitimate agreement, and the
agreement is the crime. The agreement is the most important aspect
of the conspiracy doctrine because it is the basis for early liability and
for charging both the inchoate crime and the substantive offense. 87
Moreover, it, by itself, satisfies the traditional actus reus require-
ment.8 The agreement, however, need not be a formal transaction
involving meetings and communications. 89 The prosecution need only
84. Interview with Robert Brosio, Chief Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, Cal.
(Dec. 16, 1975).
85. Inerview with George Cotsirilos, defense attorney, Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 7, 1975) ("State
court prosecutors don't have ... the resources to go after the non-street crime situation.").
86. Interview with Robert Brosio, Chief Assistant United States Attorney, Los Angeles, Cal.
(Dec. 16, 1975) (state officials often defer to federal investigative resources in sophisticated
cases, but are becoming more conscious of the conspiracy charge).
87. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
88. See Orchard, Agreement in Criminal Conspiracy, 1974 CRiM. L. REV. 297, 298-99.
89. Castro v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 686, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500, 508 (1970)
(assent inferred from nature of act, relationship and interest of conspirators; "not necessary to
show that the parties met and actually agreed"); People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471,475, 59
Cal. Rptr. 628, 630 (1967) ("tacit, mutual understanding" sufficient).
950 [Vol. 65:925
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show concert of action with all the parties working together for the
accomplishment of a common purpose. 90 It is sufficient that the
defendant was a party to an agreement to commit an unlawful act 91 at
the time the conspiracy is alleged to have been in existence, that he
understood-and committed himself to-at least the basics of the
agreement. 92
Courts consistently have held that juries may infer from the
evidence that an unlawful agreement existed despite the absence of
direct evidence of agreement. 93 The classic illustration of this is Direct
Sales Co. v. United States. 94 The defendant company, a wholesaler of
narcotics, provided inordinately large amounts of morphine sulfate to
a physician practicing in a rural community. 95 The defendant argued
that it had not entered into an agreement with the doctor to sell the
drugs illegally and had not intended that the doctor sell the goods
illegally. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction because the
company must have known that the doctor was distributing the drugs
illegally. 9 This knowledge, coupled with the unusual mass marketing
practiced by the defendant, was sufficient to sustain the existence of
an agreement in the form of a "tacit understanding." 97 The agreement
is the crucial fact, "[niot the form or manner in which the
understanding is made." 9
90. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Camacho, 528 F.2d 464,
469 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 425 U.S. 995 (1976).
91. An unlawful act is required in most, but not all, cases. See text accompanying notes 144-49
infra.
92. See Marcus, supra note 16, at 628-29.
93. Note, The United States Courts of Appeals: 1974-1975 Term Criminal Law and Procedure,
64 GEo. L.J. 165,399-400 & nn.1415-18 (1975); see, e.g., United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376,
384 (2d Cir.) (although agreement can be proved by inference, kind of agreement must be
established), cerL denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1964); Gerson v. United States, 25 F.2d 49, 56 (8th Cir.
1928) (proof of formal agreement unnecessary; natural inferences may show agreed concert of
action); United States v. Palladino, 203 F. Supp. 35, 37 (D. Mass. 1962) (Wyzanski, J.) (jury
instruction: "sufficient if their agreement is shown by conduct, by a wink or a nod, by a silent
understanding to share a purpose to violate the law"); People v. Hardeman, 244 Cal. App. 2d 1,
41, 53 Cal. Rptr. 168, 193 (1966) (conspiracy generally proved by indirect evidence, inferences
from circumstances), cert denied, 387 U.S. 912 (1967). See also Card, The Working Paper on
Inchoate Offenses: Reform of the Law of Conspiracy, 1973 CRIM. L. REv. 674, 675 (same rule in
United Kingdom). This rule comports with the general rules of proof in criminal cases. See
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1940) (circumstantial evidence intrinsically same as
testimonial evidence).
94. 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
95. Id. at 704-05.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 714.
98. Id.; accord, United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940); see United States v.
Downen, 496 F.2d 314, 319 (10th Cir. 1974) (knowledge or acquiescence in object of conspiracy
without agreement to cooperate does not make out conspiracy); United States v. Bekowies, 432
F.2d 8, 15 (9th Cir. 1970) (no conspiracy without agreement); Dennis v. United States, 302 F.2d 5,
8 (10th Cir. 1962) (unlawful agreement gist of conspiracy).
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Direct Sales holds that a jury may infer an agreement without any
direct evidence, but-and this point is crucial-neither mere
similarity of action nor aiding and abetting is the same as an
agreement.99 They may be criminal activities, but they are not
conspiratorial agreements because two or more persons have not
agreed to commit a crime. The danger that the ultimate crime will
occur is not increased to the same extent as in a true conspiracy.
PROOF OF THE AGREEMENT
Despite Direct Sales, defense lawyers are concerned that courts do
not enforce the agreement requirement and too often permit juries to
infer an agreement from too little evidence.0 0 The quality and
quantity of circumstantial evidence that has sustained some
conspiracy convictions is frightening. Moreover, the quantum of proof
required is particularly crucial in the conspiracy area; the "conspiracy
doctrine comes closest to making a state of mind the occasion for
preventive action against those who threaten society but who have
come nowhere near carrying out the threat." '01 Thus, courts should
require substantial evidence of some sort of agreement: an agreement
understood by the defendant, to which the defendant was a party, and
to which he meant to be a party.
That defendants can and do get convicted of conspiracy with little
apparent proof of an actual agreement is shown by United States v.
Miller. 102. The defendants agreed to steal a Chevrolet and to travel
across state lines with it, a violation of the Dyer Act. '01 They did so,
but were spotted by police in the second state. When the police began
to close in on them, they escaped by stealing an officer's police car,
but the car ended up in a ditch. The owners of a Ford, seeing the stuck
vehicle, pulled over to help. One of the defendants pointed two guns
at the Ford owners and took their car. All the defendants drove off in
the Ford and eventually left it in yet another state. The Government
charged the defendants with a number of offenses including separate
conspiracies to steal the Chevrolet and to steal the Ford and
99. See Louie v. United States, 218 F. 36,40 (9th Cir. 1914) (acquittal of conspiracy charge not
bar to aiding and abetting charge).
100. For example, George Cotsirilos of Chicago contended that "[tihe agreement is so easy to
prove. In a recent case the agreement just was never shown. There was weak circumstantial
evidence. It certainly was not beyond a reasonable doubt; still there were convictions." Interview
with George Cotsirilos, defense attorney, Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 7, 1975).
101. Goldstein, supra note 3, at 406.
102. 508 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1974).
103. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-2313 (1970).
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violations of the Dyer Act for both the Chevrolet and the Ford. On
appeal, the defendants contended that the evidence insufficiently
demonstrated that they had conspired to steal the Ford. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected that
argument and found that "the jury could have inferred the existence
of an agreement to steal the [Ford] from the circumstances
surrounding its acquisition and disposal by [the defendants]." 104
Miller illustrates the evidentiary situation of which defense counsel
complain so vociferously. No doubt the defendant who pulled the
guns on the Ford owners stole their car and planned to do so. Perhaps
the other defendants were guilty of aiding and abetting the driver by
going along with him and by trying to wipe the car clean when they
abandoned it, but there was no proof that they actually agreed to take
possession of the Ford and to transport it across state lines. The mere
fact that some of the defendants could have been guilty of violating
the Dyer Act, on an aiding and abetting theory, does not necessarily
mean that they had agreed to violate it.
Cases like Miller do seem to confirm the worst fears of defense
counsel. Juries can convict, and the convictions can be affirmed, on
evidence showing only a common course of conduct, or aiding and
abetting, even though no real evidence, direct or circumstantial,
proves an agreement.
Nonetheless, other cases require substantial evidence of a genuine
agreement. The most significant such case is the opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United
States v. Bufalino, 0 5 which arose out of the famous Apalachin meeting
of suspected gangland figures. Police officers stopped fifty-eight
persons for questioning as they left the home of a suspected
underworld figure, Joseph Barbara. 1 6 In response to questions
concerning their reasons for visiting Barbara, who lived in rural New
York State, the fifty eight gave a most interesting variety of answers.
Some said that their great personal friendships with Barbara brought
them to Apalachin; others said that Barbara was ill and that they were
calling on him to help him through the illness; and still others talked
about visiting for bu.iness reasons. 107 They gave similar answers to
questions put to them before a grand jury. Twenty of them were
convicted of conspiring to obstruct justice and to commit perjury
before the grand jury. 1'0 8 The Government contended that when the
104. 508 F.2d at 448.
105. 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
106. Id at 413.
107. Id at 414.
108. I& at 410.
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defendants learned of the presence of the police officers outside
Barbara's home, they must have agreed to give false answers to
explain the reason for the gathering. 109
The Second Circuit carefully weighed the Government's position,
but reversed the convictions. Judge Lumbard found that the fact that
some of the defendants obviously lied did not mean that they had
agreed to lie. Moreover, their presence in Barbara's house when they
learned of the officers did not show that they had agreed to lie.
The court noted that it was equally plausible that each defendant
decided for himself that it would be better not to discuss all that he
knew. 110 Although the reasoning in Bufalino would not necessarily
apply in a situation in which planning arguably is an inherent part of
the actions ultimately taken, the discussion is a thoughtful affirmation
of the concept that agreement is at the heart of the conspiracy
doctrine.
Cases such as Bufalino lead many to conclude that normally the
prosecution adequately establishes the agreement in conspiracy
cases. The results from the empirical research are conflicting, but do
lend support to the defense position.
Question 21: How does the conviction rate for conspiracy
charges compare to the conviction rate for completed offenses?
Much Somewhat Somewhat Much Uncer-
greater greater Same Less less tain
Prosecutors 1.3 4.4 41.1 12.7 12.7 27.8
Defense attorneys 21.3 16.9 12.2 12.6 15.0 22.0
Appellate judges 4.5 22.7 50.0 11.4 4.5 6.8
Trial judges 3.1 16.9 61.5 6.2 4.6 7.7
Law professors 2.0 17.6 25.5 23.5 11.8 19.6
Average for all 8.6 11.9 32.3 12.7 12.2 22.2
respondents
The general responses to this question can be explained by the
reluctance of many prosecutors to charge conspiracy unless they need
it. The interviews offered prosecutors the hypothetical situation of
two bank robbers caught in the act of robbing a bank and then asked:
"Would you as a prosecutor also charge conspiracy to rob the bank if
the only evidence was the defendants' presence at the bank?"
109. Id at 415.
110. Id
954 [Vol. 65:925
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Presence in the bank probably indicated that the defendants must
have agreed previously; nevertheless, few prosecutors expressed any
interest in a conspiracy charge.
In view of the prosecution's advantages in conspiracy trials, it is
difficult to understand the responses to the bank robbery hypo-
thetical and Question 7.111 In contrast to these general responses,
almost 75% of the federal defense lawyers-who handle considerably
more conspiracy cases than their state counterparts-believe that the
conspiracy conviction rate is at least somewhat higher. 112 Moreover, a
question was designed specifically to test the perceptions of the
respondents on the need to prove an agreement:
Question 22: A sells 20 cases of bootleg whiskey to B. B sells
them to C who subsequently sells them bottle by bottle. A and
C are not acquainted. Will the conviction of A for conspiring
with C be affirmed on appeal?
Yes No Need more facts
Prosecutors 16.8 59.0 24.1
Defense attorneys 28.5 48.4 23.2
Appellate judges 11.6 44.2 44.2
Trial judges 33.9 30.6 35.5
Law professors 18.0 23.0 59.0
Average for all 22.0 49.1 28.9
respondents
Although the hypothetical indicated neither that A imagined the
whiskey would be sold by anyone other than B, nor that A's interestwas
anything other than selling the whiskey to B, one-third of the trial
judges were willing to convict or uphold a jury verdict convicting, even
111. See note 53 supra.
112. The breakdown between state and federal defense attorneys follows:
Some- Some-
Much what what Much Un-
greater greater Same less less certain
Federal defense 41.2 32.4 17.6 5.9 -- 2.9
attorneys
State defense 17.1 13.7 11.8 14.2 18.0 25.1
attorneys
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though there was no proof of any agreement or understanding
between A and C. 113
It appears from these responses that the concerns of the defense
lawyers are justified in many cases. One commentator has even
suggested that conspiracy may be more accurately defined as
"adherence to a joint criminal venture" because the existence of an
agreement often cannot be proved directly and must be inferred from
concerted action. 1 1 4 The distinction in theory is a subtle one, looking
to the nature of the act-adherence-rather than to the nature of the
intended understanding-agreement. The distinction, however, may
be devastating in practice. An individual might aid in the performance
of the object of a conspiracy, a jailbreak for example, and could be
charged with such aid; but, if he did not know about the planning of
the jailbreak and merely took advantage of an opportunity to escape,
he is not a conspirator. 115
To punish such a person for conspiracy is to turn the theory of
conspiracy on its head, because such punishment would be for the
criminal act that is the object of the combination, not for the
agreement that leads to the criminal objective. Moreover, neither of
the purposes for conspiracy law supports such an application.
Nevertheless, a disturbing number of respondents believed that the
late joiner can be indicted for conspiracy and for the substantive
113. The 28.9% of respondents who correctly perceived that additional facts were
needed most often focused on the degree of knowledge of the parties. For example, if A knew that
B continuously engaged in selling the whiskey to others, A might be part of the larger conspiracy
due to his knowledge and implied intent to have that larger conspiracy prosper and continue.
114. Johnson, supra note 3, at 1142 n.17; see People v. Bailey, 60 Ill. 2d 37, 47-48,322 N.E.2d
804, 810 (1975) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (need only show conspirators pursued course toward
accomplishing objective); People v. Fedele, 366 Ill. 618, 622, 10 N.E.2d 346,348 (1937) (same).
115. A case similar to this recently came out of the District of Columbia Circuit. In United
States v. Bridgemran, some of the inmates prosecuted for conspiracy in connection with an
attempted prison break contended that they were not involved in the planning of the escape, but
had participated in the actual escape attempt only when they became aware of the possibilities
created by the tumult. 523 F.2d 1099, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976).
The appeals court stated that a defendant could be convicted of conspiracy if he "knew of the
conspiracy, associated himself with it and knowingly contributed his efforts during its life to
further its design." Id. at 1108. The evidence in Bridgeman might justify a factual finding of an
agreement under the current law of conspiracy, but the point is that neither the group danger nor
the inchoate offense rationales support the conspiracy charge against the defendant who did not
join in the escape until it had started. Many other charges were available-rioting, assault,
attempted escape, and aiding and abetting such offenses. The conduct of the defendant "who
perceived that an escape would be attempted and who decided to leave his cell and act in
furtherance of that objective," id. at 1111, amounts to little more than aiding and abetting, and
the Supreme Court has recently reiterated that the crime of conspiracy is not to be confused with
the crime of aiding and abetting. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975).
956
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offense in a case in which that offense had already been completed
when he joined the conspiracy. 116
Question 23: A and B agree to defraud an insurance firm and,
in furtherance of the plan, kidnap someone. After the
kidnapping C joins in on the scheme to defraud. In addition to
conspiracy to defraud, C should be indicted for:
Conspiracy
to kidnap Kidnapping Neither
.Prosecutors 8.8 26.8 64.4
Defense attorneys 9.1 18.6 72.3
Appellate judges 17.5 2.5 80.0
Trial judges 24.6 12.3 63.2
Law professors 6.8 8.5 84.7
Average for all 10.5 20.0 69.5
respondents
This misconception should not be surprising in view of the larger
distortion of the conspiracy rationale that is becoming the law, the
unilateral approach to conspiracy.
THE UNILATERAL APPROACH
Under the so-called rule of consistency, courts refuse to convict one
defendant of conspiracy if all other alleged coconspirators have been
acquitted. 117 There are exceptions to this rule: the release of the other
conspirator must be by a judgment on the merits in the same
116. A late joiner does not become liable for earlier substantive offenses. United States v.
Knippenberg, 502 F.2d 1056,1059-60 (7th Cir. 1974); see Levine v. United States, 383 U.S. 265,
266 (1966) (per curiam) (concession by Solicitor General that defendant not liable for substantive
offense committed by other conspirators before defendant joined scheme).
117. United States v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045, 1055 (7th Cir. 1974) (acquittal of all but one
alleged conspirator operates as acquittal of remaining defendant); United States v. Musgrave,
483 F.2d 327,333 (5th Cir.) (conviction of one defendantof conspiracy when others acquitted not
acceptable), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 779-80
(4th Cir. 1971) (conviction of one conspirator impermissible when only coconspirator acquitted);
Lubin v. United States, 313 F.2d 419,423 (9th Cir. 1963) (same);see Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367,375 (1951) (dictum) (atleasttwo persons needed for conspiracy, butidentity of one may
be unknown).
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prosecution; 118 generally a nolle prosequi is insufficient. 119 Moreover,
the rule does not apply if the prosecution shows that other
conspirators were involved, even though the indictment did not name
these conspirators,1 20 or even though it named them but did not
formally charge them. 121 The consistency rule makes sense, as do its
limitations, because conspiracy requires an agreement between two
or more persons; if only one person is found to have actually agreed,
there is no agreement and no conspiracy. 122
The consistency rule has not gone unchallenged. The Model Penal
Code and the proposed revised federal criminal code reject it and
look entirely to the culpability and state of mind of the accused,
embracing the so-called unilateral approach toward conspiracy. Thus,
the acquittal of all other alleged conspirators would not necessarily
undercut a finding of guilt as to one conspirator. 121
118. People v. Holzer, 25 Cal. App. 3d 456, 460, 102 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (1972) (jury trying X
alone may find that X and Y were coconspirators, and subsequent acquittal of Y for conspiring
with X does not affect validity of first jury's conviction).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56, 58 (3d Cir.) (nolle prosequi of two named
conspirators no bar to conviction of third), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666 (1942); Regle v. State, 9 Md.
App. 346, 353, 264 A.2d 119, 123 (Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (better view is nolle prosequi does not
compel acquittal of remaining conspirator); State v. Goldman, 95 N.J. Super. 50, 53, 229 A.2d
818, 819 (App. Div. 1967) (per curiam) (nolle prosequi of one conspirator no bar to
conviction of other); State v. Verdugo, 79 N.M. 765,766,449 P.2d 781,782 (1969) (same); Cline
v. State, 204 Tenn. 251,259,319 S.W.2d 227,231 (1958) (nolle prosequi of one conspirator and
not guilty verdict of otherno barto convictionof third). Contra, Berness v. State, 40 Ala. App. 198,
201, 133 So. 2d 178, 180 (Ct. App. 1958) (majority rule that nolle prosequi a bar to prosecuting
remaining conspirator).
120. United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356, 1365 (5th Cir.) (conviction reversed where
evidence of conspiracy with unknown conspirators insufficient), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3168
(1976); Cross v. United States, 392 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1968) (indictment naming unknown
conspirators may stand if evidence to support charge); People v. James, 189 Cal. App. 2d 14, 15,
10 Cal. Rptr. 809, 810 (1961) (indictment may name one conspirator, refer to others unknown).
121. The practice of naming but not indicting alleged coconspirators will be less common after
United States v. Briggs, at least in the Fifth Circuit. See 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975). The court
found that the practice denied the alleged coconspirators their due process rights because they
would nothave an opportunity to establish their innocence at trial. Id. at806, 808. See also United
States. v. Peraino, No. Cr-75-91 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 22,1976) (order expungingnamed, unindicted
alleged coconspirator).
122. See United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 459 (4th Cir.) (conspiracy ends when two of
three conspirators arrested absent evidence of other unknown conspirators), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 907 (1967); State v. Horton, 275 N.C. 651,657,170 S.E.2d 466,470 (1969) (no conspiracy
where one of two alleged conspirators feigns acquiescence in scheme), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959
(1970); cf. Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1965) (informant may serve as
connecting link between conspirators unknown to one another); King v. State, 104 So. 2d 730,
738 (Fla. 1958) (per curiam) (no conspiracy between two persons and undercover agent where
agentto perform essential act of offense); United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429,430 (N.D. Ga. 1925)
(conspiracy possible between defendant and undercover agent).
123. See MODEL PENAL CODE §5.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); Criminal Justice
Reform Act of 1975, S. 1,, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1002(d) (1975) (eliminating defense that
coconspirators acquitted, not prosecuted, incompetent, or immune).
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State v. St. Christopher 124 demonstrates the problem the drafters of
the codes addressed in adopting the unilateral approach. The
defendant told his cousin that he wanted help in murdering the
defendant's mother. The cousin feigned agreement and told the
police of the plan. Just prior to the planned murder, the police, with
the cousin's cooperation, stepped in and arrested the defendant. The
defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder
and of attempted first-degree murder. 125 The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed the conspiracy conviction, stating that the new
Minnesota conspiracy statute, 126 unlike the old one, used a unilateral
approach that permitted a conspiracy conviction even without a true
agreement. 12 7 The new statute had adopted the Model Penal Code's
unilateral approach, "Whoever conspires with another." 128 The court
held as it did because St. Christopher had conspired with his cousin,
even though the cousin had not conspired with him. 29 The court
pointed out that the true agreement requirement was a strict
doctrinal approach conceiving of conspiracy as an actual meeting of
the minds, 30 and concluded that requiring a meeting of the minds was
wrong because conspiracy is an inchoate offense, and "the act of
conspiring by a defendant . . . is the decisive element of
criminality." 31
The unilateral approach makes sense at first blush. 132 The
unsuccessful conspirator did try to conspire-his state of mind was
124. 232 N.W.2d 798 (Minn. 1975).
125. Id. at 799-800.
126. MINN. STAT. §609.175(2) (Supp. 1976).
127. 232 N.W.2d at 803.
128. Id. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §5.03(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) with MINN.
STAT. § 609.175(2) (Supp. 1976). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 15.02 (Vernon 1974); Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975, S. 1,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1002(d) (1975).
129. See 232 N.W.2d at 803.
130. Id. at 801.
131. Id. at 802; see id. at 803; MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1960). The Comment states:
He has conspired, within the meaning of the definition, in the belief that the other
party was with him; apart from the issue of entrapment often presented in such
cases, his culpability is not decreased by the other's secret intention. True enough,
the project's chances of success have not been increased by the agreement; indeed,
its doom may have been sealed by this turn of events. But the major basis of
conspirational liability-the unequivocal evidence of a firm purpose to commit a
crime-remains the same.
132. I am grateful for the assistance of my colleagues Peter Hay and William Hawkland in
analyzing the unilateral approach.
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clearly criminal-but did he enter into a conspiracy? The conspiracy
charge may subject the defendant to criminal liability at an earlier
stage than any other inchoate offense and may raise procedural
problems at trial. The stated reason for such results is the special
danger resulting from group planning. 133Group activities, it is said,
are more likely to lead to serious antisocial acts than are the acts of
one person.134 What rationale, then, is present for punishing St.
Christopher as a conspirator although he did not enter into a true
agreement? None. St. Christopher may have been guilty of a number
of crimes, but conspiracy was not one of them. 13 5 Two persons did not
combine forces to commit a crime. Certainly St. Christopher had a
guilty state of mind, but nowhere else in the criminal law can one be
guilty of a crime solely based upon a state of mind. 136 The Supreme
Court has stated that "lilt is impossible in the nature of things for a
man to conspire with himself. In California as elsewhere conspiracy
imports a corrupt agreement between not less than two with guilty
knowledge on the part of each."' 137
As a practical matter, most attorneys thought that the unilateral
approach would not have a significant impact on conspiracy
prosecutions. The one area in which it might have had an important
impact, purchase and sale of narcotics, usually involves more than
one true conspirator and the informant or undercover agent; many
persons often form the ring. Nevertheless, defense lawyers and
appellate judges, in particular, thought that the unilateral approach
would have some impact on conspiracy prosecutions.
133. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.
134. See id.
135. The Minnesota court ultimately reversed the conviction for attempted murder, finding
that the statute did not permit conviction for both attempt and conspiracy. 232 N.W.2d at 804.
Nonetheless, there appeared to be sufficient evidence to support an attempt conviction because
the defendant took a substantial step toward the completion of the crime.
136. See H. PACKER, THE LIuTS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 73-79 (1968) (with possible
exceptions of civil commitment and crimes of status, no culpability without conduct).
137. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 92 (1934) (citations omitted).
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Question 24: IfA could be convicted of conspiracy for agreeing
with B, an undercover police officer, to commit a crime, how
would the number of conspiracies charged in your district
change? ' 3
8
Substantial Some No Some Substantial
increase increase change decrease decrease
Prosecutors 18.5 33.5 45.0 1.6 1.3
Defense attorneys 47.6 28.4 22.0 1.6 0.4
Appellate judges 37.5 32.5 27.5 2.5 -
Trial judges 27.9 44.3 26.2 1.6 -
Law professors 24.5 49.1 22.6 3.8 -
Average for all 31.0 33.8 32.8 1.5 1.0
respondents
A number of defense attorneys spoke out strongly against the
unilateral approach. One remarked:
The unilateral approach could become another abuse. It is
obviously designed not as sound doctrine to punish joint
crime. It is like the king's spies waiting for someone to say
something and then arresting him: you are punishing
someone for thinking of talking, not for being engaged in
dangerous joint criminal activity, because it really is not an
agreement. 139
138. This was one case in which federal and state practitioners gave very similar responses:
Substantial Some No Some Substantial
Increase increase change decrease decrease
Federal
prosecutors 18.5 44.4 37.0 -- --
State
prosecutors 18.6 32.6 45.6 1.8 1.4
Federal
defense
attorneys 39.4 39.4 18.2 -- 3.0
State
defense
attorneys 49.0 26.4 22.6 1.9 --
139. Interview with Robert Kasanof, former teacher of criminal law and head of a legal aid
office, in New York City (Jan. 19, 1976).
1977]
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Protestations about the strict doctrinal approach leave unexplained
how the group danger rationale can be distorted to punish someone
who does not pose the sort of increased danger that should give rise to
a conspiracy conviction. 4 ' No one-not the American Law Insti-
tute, 141 the Brown Commission, 142 the Minnesota Supreme Court, or
any of the legislatures that have adopted the unilateral ap-
proach-has answered this. An evil state of mind and the limited act
of asking someone to agree to commit a crime ought not to result in
criminal responsibility under a conspiracy statute. 14 3
THE OBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT
Conspiracy prosecutions usually involve only agreements to commit
relatively serious crimes. Indeed, virtually every attorney with whom
I spoke was careful to talk about conspiracy in the context of a very
few object crimes, often a drug, fraud, or weapons offense.'44 This is
140. What danger there is in the inchoate unilateral crime can be handled by laws other than
conspiracy. Interview with Elliott Golden, Kings County (Brooklyn) District Attorney's Office
(Jan. 20,1976) (so-called unilateral agreementis covered by crimes like solicitation and attempt).
141. The Model Penal Code's rationale for the unilateral approach should be compared with
the Code's apparent position that a person aiding a conspiracy cannot be prosecuted for
conspiracy unless he agrees to aid the conspiracy, although he can be prosecuted as an
accomplice. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §5.03(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (person
guilty of conspiracy if he agrees to aid otherin planningof crime) with id. §2.06(3)(a)(ii) (person is
accomplice if he aids or agrees or attempts to aid another in an offense) and id. § 5.01(3) (person
who engages in conduct designed to aid another to commit crime is guilty of attempt to commit the
crime). One wonders whether the Code requires a true consensus in the aiding and abetting
situations when it ignores the absence of such consensus in the situation where a person in essence
is conspiring with himself.
142. See NATIONAL COMMN ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORTreprinted in
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 224-26 (1971) (no discussion of usage of unilateral
conspiracy language in defining conspiracy).
143. One approach would have convicted St. Christopher of attempting to conspire to commit
murder. Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 3, at 926 n.35. The Minnesota
court rejected that suggestion because "it would result in disparate sentences for defendants
whose conduct was the same, the length of sentence turning on a fortuity." 232 N.W.2d at 803 n.7
(the fortuity being whether the person approached was feigning agreement or was serious). A
more fundamental objection, however, is that this approach results in a person being convicted of
attempting to commit an inchoate offense. Such conduct is remarkably distant from the ultimate
act that society fears. In the absence of the supposed danger from the conspiratorial combination
of more than one person, as in the unilateral agreement situation, the defendant ought to be
charged with attempt to commit the substantive offense or ought not be charged at all.
144. A number of states have limited felony conspiracy to a few object crimes or to only those
object crimes that are themselves felonies. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 38 (Michie 1976 Repl.
Vol.) (punishment for conspiracy may not exceed maximum for object offense); MO. ANN. STAT.
§556.120 (Vernon Supp. 1977) (conspiracy a felony only if object crime is murder, rape, arson, or
robbery).
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not always the case, however, and some statutes permit conspiracy
prosecutions although no crime was planned. 145 In Kentucky v.
Donoghue 146 the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to engage in
the business of lending money and charging usurious interest rates, 147
although no Kentucky statute made it a crime for an individual to
charge usurious interest rates. 148 A Kentucky statute did make it a
crime to conspire to commit an act injurious to the public health or
morals, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals focused on the object of
the agreement: "If ever there was a violation of public policy as
reflected by the statutes and public conscience, or a combination
opposed to the common weal, it is that sort of illegitimate business. 
149
What is the rationale for holding that something can be legal if done
by one person yet illegal if planned by more than one? Such a result
has no support at all in the theoretical purposes for conspiracy. If the
object act is not unlawful, intercepting individuals before they commit
the object act has no justification. If the object act is not unlawful, the
added danger that a group is more likely to carry it out is similarly
irrelevant. Either the act is unlawful or it is not. If the act itself is
legal, conviction for planning to commit the act is an absurd result. '50
145. ALA. CODE tit. 14 § 103 (1958) (conspiracy defined, inter alia, as two or more persons
conspiring to commit any act injurious to public health, morals, trade or commerce); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 182 (West 1969) (same); IDAHO CODE § 18-1701 (1949) (same); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-1-1
(1972) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.480 (1957) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §421 (West
Supp. 1976) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-1101 (1955) (same). Contra, Florida Criminal Code,
1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 383, §66 (repealing conspiracy to injure public health); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
17-A, § 151(1) (Supp. 1976) (object of conspiracy must in fact constitute a crime or crimes);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §94-4-102 (1973) (repealing noncriminal object conspiracy laws).
146. 250 Ky. 343, 63 S.W.2d 3 (1933).
147. Id at 344, 63 S.W.2d at 3.
148. Id at354, 63 S.W.2d at 7. The majority did not address the apparent ex post facto nature
of such a conviction pointed out by the dissent. See id. at 358, 63 S.W.2d at 9 (Clay, J., with
Dietzman, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 355, 63 S.W.2d at 8.
150. See MODEL PENAL CODE §5.03, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960) (rejecting
criminalization of conspiracy to do acts legally done individually); Sayre, supra note 3, at 427.
Sayre states that-
Perhaps enough has been said to make it evident that it is high time to abandon the
prevalent and often repeated idea that mere combination in itself can add
criminality or illegality to acts otherwise free from them. Such a doctrine grew out of
an historical mistake, and has no real basis in our law. It is logically unsound and
indefensible. Moreover, itis dangerous. It tends to rob the law of predictability and
to make justice depend too often upon the chance prejudices and convictions of
individual judges.
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There are two constitutional difficulties with criminalizing an
agreement to commit a lawful act injurious to the public health or
morals. The first is that it appears to be an ex post facto law. "' As the
dissenters in Donoghue pointed out, it was not illegal to be a loan
shark in Kentucky, and the revelation that to agree to charge usurious
interest rates was against public health and morality came only at the
defendant's trial. 152
The second and perhaps more fundamental difficulty is the
vagueness of such a statute. 15 3 InMusser v. Utah' 4 the defendant was
convicted of conspiracy "'to commit acts injurious to public
morals . . .,' acts which amount briefly to conspiring to counsel,
advise, and practice polygamous or plural marriage . . . ." 51 Justice
Jackson, speaking for the Supreme Court, noted that "this is no
narrowly drawn statute." 116 Indeed, he questioned whether the
statute "cover[s] so much that it effectively covers nothing."' 7
Although the Court looked favorably on Musser's due process
argument, it refused to strike down the statute. Instead, it remanded
the case, saying that the statute "does not stand by itself as the law of
Utah but is part of the whole body of common and statute law of that
State and is to be judged in that context.""5' On remand, the Utah
Supreme Court saw its job as deciding whether it could "place a
construction on these words which limits their meaning beyond their
general meaning." 59 The court considered the legislative history of
the statute and the surrounding historical circumstances and
concluded that the legislature meant what it said when it wrote the
statute. The law was struck down as being "void for vagueness and
uncertainty." 160
Although some courts, following Musser, have struck down such
statutes, 16' many states continue to include acts against public health
or morals in the definition of conspiracy. 62 Perhaps the infrequency of
151. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 3.
152. 250 Ky. at 358, 63 S.W.2d at 9 (Clay, J., with Dietzman, J., dissenting).
153. See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1951) (measured by common under-
standing, statute must provide sufficiently definite warning of proscribed conduct). See generally
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
154. 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
155. It at 96.
156. Id. at 97.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 539, 223 P.2d 193, 194 (1950).
160. Id.
161. E.g., State v. Bowling, 5 Ariz. App. 436, 440, 427 P.2d 928, 932 (1967) (invalidating as
void for vagueness statute criminalizing conspiracy to commit any act injurious to public morals).
162. See note 145 supra.
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prosecution explains the continued existence of such laws. Most
prosecutors with limited resources concentrate their efforts on
conspiracies to commit serious crimes. Notwithstanding this attitude,
statutes such as these ought to be repealed, if for no other reason than
their potential for abuse and their denigrating effect on the criminal
justice system.
ABANDONMENT AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE AGREEMENT
Unless the conspirator signals his departure from the endeavor
prior to a true agreement or an overt act, he will be liable for the
conspiracy until it ends. 163 Once the conspiracy has formed, he may
withdraw from it, but he will be subject to a conspiracy charge and
responsible for any acts in furtherance of the conspiracy committed
prior to his withdrawal. 164
To accomplish effective withdrawal from the conspiracy, the
defendant must take some "affirmative act bringing home the fact of
his withdrawal to his confederates."' 1 5 As stated by the Supreme
Court, he must do "some act to disavow or defeat the purpose [of the
conspiracy]." 166 Thus, the act must be accomplished prior to the end
of the conspiracy and must be timed so that the other conspirators
could follow the disavowing defendant's lead and withdraw from the
conspiracy. Cases involving true withdrawals from a conspiracy are
rare; most cases involve situations in which the defendant tries to
recant after the fact. In those cases, the courts always disallow the
defense.
CONCLUSIONS
"We don't need it; it creates unfair advantages for the prosecu-
tion." "The conspiracy charge is essential if we are to combat serious
organized crime." These comments are typical of the remarks I heard
over a two-year period from defense counsel and prosecutors across
the country. Who is right? Is the concept of a punishable criminal
agreement unfair except in the narrowest of situations? Is it actually
needed to deal with organized criminal activities? The questions are
simple; the answers are not. For every generalization about the crime
163. Note, supra note 93, at 401.
164. Id Once the defendant has withdrawn, he can limit the subsequent acts and declarations
of coconspirators that otherwise could be used against him. Loser v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App.
2d 30, 32, 177 P.2d 320, 321 (1947).
165. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912).
166. Id.
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of conspiracy, there are other-seemingly contradictory-beliefs.
Conspiracy is often an effective tool for dealing with some serious
group criminal behavior. 67 On the other hand, group behavior is not
always more dangerous than individual behavior.
The interviews with, and questionnaire responses from, the many
attorneys and judges I contacted articulate the theoretical purposes
for the crime of conspiracy and also give an insight into the manner in
which those purposes are reflected in practice. 168 It is difficult to say
that we should entirely eliminate the crime of conspiracy, but the
conspiracy doctrine can subject defendants to unfair practices. What
is needed is the formulation of standards defining the kind of serious
group criminal behavior that should be the subject of conspiracy
prosecutions.
Stating such standards with precision is difficult. They should not
be codified, and should focus on prosecutorial discretion. The most
important thing to keep in mind in establishing the standards is that
Professor Johnson was probably correct that the conspiracy charge is
unnecessary in many if not most prosecutions. 161 In the inchoate
situation, the crime of attempt does or could handle most
uncompleted offenses. In addition, the guidelines could sharply
curtail conspiracy charges and convictions without any significant loss
to the prosecution of serious crimes. 170 In most cases in which
conspiracy is charged, other offenses are or could be charged, thus
eliminating the need for the surplus conspiracy allegation. Consecu-
tive sentencing is rare and elimination of the conspiracy charge would
not necessarily eliminate such procedural practices as venue rules,
the complicity doctrine, and joinder.
Curbing the number of conspiracies charged would alleviate some
of the problems so vociferously discussed by defense lawyers:
convictions due to hearsay statements, limited proof of true
agreements, and large and complex joint trials. Such a policy would
not eliminate conspiracy in the situations in which it is both proper
and necessary, such as the true inchoate offense in which no attempt
has been made, or the substantive crime situation in which a large
scale criminal endeavor can only be shown and proved by reference to
167. Contra Johnson, supra note 3, at 1188.
168. I am deeply indebted to the many lawyers and judges who took the time to speak or
correspond with me and to answer the questionnaire. Only a few are named in the article, but
without the help of all of them the article would have been impossible.
169. Johnson, supra note 3, at 1139.
170. Some states already provide that a defendant cannot be convicted of both conspiracy and
of the substantive offense. See note 51 supra.
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the concept of a criminal conspiracy. These situations, however, are
relatively few. Until the charge is curbed, the conspiracy doctrine will
remain the source of considerable confusion and, more troublingly,
the source of at least occasional injustice.
APPENDIX A
1. How long have you practiced criminal law? What is the nature of your practice, or the
practice in the office where you work?
2. How often is conspiracy charged, either by itself or in connection with another offense?
3. What is the major advantage of utilizing conspiracy when there is a substantive offense
which can be charged?
4. What is the advantage of conspiracy generally?
5. Does conspiracy, more than other offenses, either inchoate or substantive, raise serious
problems for defendants?
6. What is the rationale for having a crime in which the agreement forms the basis of the
sanction?
7. Have you noticed any substantial changes in conspiracy doctrine or in the manner in which
conspiracy prosecutions are pursued since you began practice?
8. What would be the impact of requiring direct evidence for proof of the agreement; what
would be the impact of requiring, for proof of an overt act, an actwhich is a substantial step
toward the completion of the crime?
9. What would be the impact of eliminating the hearsay exception?
10. Does the so-called Wharton's Rule arise very much in practice?
11. What sorts of First Amendment issues are raised in connection with conspiracy cases
which are not raised in other cases?
12. How substantial a problem is the First Amendment issue in connection with conspiracy
cases?
13. Whatwould be the impactof prohibitingthe use, in cases in which First Amendmentissues
are raised, of circumstantial evidence as per the Castro case?
14. Is the conviction rate any different for conspiracy than it is for other offenses?
15. What is the largest case you have personal knowledge of? Largest, that is, defined to mean
the greatest number of defendants at trial.
16. Do large trials create unusual problems for the prosecution or for the defense; what are the
rules with regard to severance? Should these rules be changed?
17. Does the complicity rule in Pinkerton make sense? How often is this rule applied in
practice?
18. Do the particular conspiracy rules as to venue create serious questions for either the
prosecution or for the defense?
19. What sorts of limitations, if any, would you propose in connection with prosecutions for
criminal conspiracy?
20. As a practical matter how often is a defendant given consecutive sentences when he is
convicted of conspiracy and of committing the substantive offense which is the object of
that conspiracy?
21. Do you foresee any changes in either the theory of criminal conspiracy or the manner in
which the crime is prosecuted?
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APPENDIX B
1. In what area of criminal law are you most involved?
2. Where does most of your case load come from? Metropolitan area of more than 500,000
persons. Metropolitan area of 100,000 to 500,000 persons. Metropolitan area of less than
100,000 persons. Primarily rural area.
3. How long have you been involved in some phase of criminal law? Less than 5 years. 5-10
years. More than 10 years.
4. Are the majority of your cases tried in federal or state court?
5. When two or more persons are brought to trial for a substantive felony, what percent of the
time are they also brought to trial on a conspiracy charge?
6a. Are you or have you ever been a prosecutor?
b. What motivated you to bring a conspiracy charge where the object offense had been
completed or attempted? (Circle all that apply) Evidentiary advantages. Venue con-
siderations. Possibilities of greater sentence for defendant. Advantages in connection with
plea bargaining. Other (Specify).
7. What percentage of conspiracy charges is for conspiracy only and not in conjunction with a
substantive or completed offense?
8. In what percentage of cases where conspiracy alone was charged had the object crime been
completed or attempted?
9. How does the conviction rate for conspiracy charges compare to the conviction rate for
completed offenses? Is the conviction rate for conspiracy charges . . . much greater;
somewhat greater; about the same; somewhat less; much less; uncertain.
10. How does the conviction rate for a conspiracy charge change when charged and tried along
with a substantive count? Is it... much greater than when conspiracy is charged alone;
somewhat greater than when conspiracy charged alone; about the same as when
conspiracy charged alone; somewhat less than when conspiracy charged alone; much less
than when conspiracy charged alone; uncertain.
11. How does the conviction rate for a substantive count change when charged and tried along
with a conspiracy count? Is it... much greater than when substantive count charged alone;
somewhat greater than when substantive count charged alone; about the same as when
substantive count charged alone; somewhat less than when sustantive count charged
alone; much less than when substantive count charged alone; uncertain.
12. What percentage of felonies charged in your district is for the crime of conspiracy?
13. Is a conviction for conspiracy in yourjurisdiction... a felony; a misdemeanor; can be either
a felony or a misdemeanor.
14. Is the penalty for a conspiracy conviction... a fixed term equal to the term of the object
offense; a fixed term which is a percentage of the term for the object offense; a fixed term
determined independent of the object offense.
15. What do you feel is the greatest advantage(s) for the prosecution in conspiracy trials
involving more than one defendant? (Circle all that apply.) Admissibility of hearsay
evidence. Admissibility of one conspirator's acts "in furtherance of the conspiracy"
against all other conspirators. The reaction of the jury or judge to the alleged danger of
group activity. The confusion in the minds of the jury when there are many conspirators
charged - thus causing them to convict all charged. Rules with regard to venue. Other
(Specify).
16. When a defendant is convicted on both the conspiracy charge and the substantive charge,
what percent of the time is consecutive sentencing employed?
17. In what percent of cases does the jury convict some but not all of the alleged conspirators?
18. Do you agree or disagree with this statement- As the number of defendants in a joint
conspiracy trial increases, there is a greater chance that all of the defendants will be
convicted.
19. With which one of the following statements are you most in agreement? (Circle one) There is
a greater danger in conspiracy because of the encouragement and aid that conspirators
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give each other. There is less danger in conspiracy because of the possibilities of
infiltration by undercover officers and disagreement among conspirators. Neither of the
above, depends on the fact situation.
20. What would be the effect of requiring direct evidence of the conspiratorial agreement?
Significant reduction in convictions. Small reduction in convictions. No effect on
conviction rate.
21. What would be the effect of requiring, for purposes of the overt act, a "substantial step"
toward commission of the crime? Significant reduction in convictions. Small reduction in
convictions. No effect on conviction rate.
22. What would be the result of eliminating the hearsay exception in cases where conspiracy is
charged or where it is the uncharged basis for the charged crime? Significant reduction in
convictions. Small reduction in convictions. No effect on conviction rates.
23. What is the largest conspiracy trial, insofar as number of defendants in a joint trial, that
you have handled or know of from personal knowledge?
24. Have the majority of joint conspiracy trials that you are aware of had.., less than 5
defendants; between 5 and 10 defendants; more than 10 defendants.
25. What would be the impact, in a multidistrict conspiracy, of allowing prosecution only in the
district where the agreement was made as opposed to allowing prosecution where any overt
act occurred? Would this ... severely limit prosecution; hamper prosecution to some
extent; have almost no effect on the prosecution.
26. How often does the ability of prosecution to establish venue in places other than where the
agreement was formed actually disadvantage defendants? Often. Sometimes. Seldom.
Never.
27. Whatwould be the impactof doing away with conspiracy and utilizing attempt crimes in its
place? Great reduction of convictions. Some reduction of convictions. Little or no
effect. Some increase in convictions. Great increase in convictions.
28. If"A" could be convicted of conspiracy for agreeingwith "B," an undercover police officer,
to commit a crime, how would the number of conspiracies charged in your district change?
Would the number... substantially increase; somewhat increase; not change; somewhat
decrease; substantially decrease.
29. "A" and "B" agree to defraud an insurance firm and, in furtherance of the plan, kidnap
someone. After the kidnapping "C" joins in on the scheme to defraud. In addition to
conspiracy to defraud, "C" should be indicted for... conspiracy to kidnap; the completed
offense of kidnapping; neither of the above.
30. "A" sells 20 cases of bootleg whiskey to "B". "B" sells them to "C" who subsequently sells
them bottle by bottle. "A" and "C" are not acquainted. Will the conviction of "A" for
conspiring with "C" be affirmed on appeal?
31. In what percent of conspiracy cases are there co-conspirators indicted together who are not
personally acquainted?
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